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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The instant reply brief in necessary to provide this Court with the corrected 
restitution amount that Ms. Schultz either consented to or was required to pay as a 
result of her criminal convictions and to address the State's assertions that under the 
plain language of I.C. § 19-5304, Ms. Schultz is required to pay certain restitution even 
if the jury could not have convicted her of criminal conduct from which that restitution 
was derived. As is set forth below, Ms. Schultz is liable for $19,421 of the restitution 
ordered, as only that amount is derived from the offenses and evidence upon which she 
was found guilty by a jury and was resulting from her criminal offenses. Additionally, the 
State's argument that Ms. Schultz is required to pay restitution for amounts stemming 
from alleged conduct not presented to the jury is without merit. See State v. Shafer, 
144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a criminal defendant that 
pied guilty to leaving the scene of an accident is not responsible for damages derived 
from the accident as those damages were not resulting from the adjudicated criminal 
conduct). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred By Imposing Restitution In The Amount Of $21.985.28 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Schultz contends that only $19,421 of the restitution order was derived from 
her criminal convictions at trial. Therefore, because Ms. Schultz did not consent to pay 
restitution beyond that stemming from her criminal convictions, the district court erred in 
imposing restitution in excess of that amount. 
B. The District Court Erred By Imposing Restitution In The Amount Of $21.985.28 
The decision whether to require restitution is within the trial court's sound 
discretion. State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 942, 935 P.2d 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the district court. 
State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 544, 768 P .2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1989). The exercise 
of discretion must encompass consideration of the amount of economic loss sustained 
by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning 
ability of the defendant, and other factors deemed appropriate by the court. Id; 
I.C. § 19-5304(7). Findings on the amount of restitution, if supported by substantial 
evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bybee at 544, 768 P.2d 804. 
1 . Correct Conceded Restitution Amount 
In her Appellant's brief, Ms. Schultz argued that at most, only $18,345 of the 
ordered restitution amount was derived from her adjudicated criminal conduct. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.1, 6-12.) The State countered, asserting that Ms. Schultz had 
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conceded $19,435 of the ordered restitution. (See Respondent's Brief, p.5, footnote 3.) 
However, upon recalculation, again, it appears as though both parties were incorrect. 
Ms. Schultz concedes that $19,421 of the $21,985.28 ordered restitution was permitted 
by I.C. § 19-5304 or consented to by Ms. Schultz in the district court. The conceded 
amounts are as follows: 








Merrill Lynch Visa Card 
CitiBank Mastercard 
Category 
Purchase from Figis 
Late Fees/ Finance Charges 
Total 
















(See Appellant's Brief, pp.1-12; R., pp.197-202.) 
Accordingly, as is articulated herein and in Ms. Schultz' Appellant's Brief, 
Ms. Schultz is only responsible for $19,421.00 in restitution from her adjudicated 
criminal conduct and acquiescence to certain amounts in the district court. 
1 Part of the discrepancy in restitution by the parties appears to be based on the district 
court's calculation of its totals from this category. The district court found that total for 
this category to be $9,493.36. However, adding up the amounts in this category, the 
total was $9,479.36. (See R., p.198.) 
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2. Only $19,421 Of The Ordered Restitution Was Resulting From 
Ms. Schultz' Adjudicated Criminal Conduct Or Was Consented To By 
Ms. Schultz 
In its briefing, the State argues that the district court did not error in ordering 
Ms. Schultz to pay $2,437.57 in restitution for alleged unauthorized purchases on the 
Ms. Shayne's U.S. Bank Account, Macy's Visa, and CitiBank Master Card. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9.) The State does not argue that there was evidence produced 
at trial showing that she made unauthorized purchases in the contested amount such 
that the jury could have found her guilty of the alleged unauthorized purchases. Rather, 
the State argues that because she was charged and convicted of grand theft "by 
exercising unauthorized control of Ms. Shayne's 'credit card accounts and/or bank 
accounts' between October 2003 and May 2004," the contested amount falls under both 
the plain language and legislative intent of the restitution statute, even though there was 
no evidence offered regarding any improper use of Ms. Shayne's credit/bank cards in 
those amounts. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-15.) Thus, the State theorizes that because 
Ms. Schultz was in possession of those cards, and after the trial Ms. Shayne alleged 
that certain purchases were not made by her, which the State did not introduce 
evidence of during that trial, Ms. Schultz is responsible for paying those restitution 
amounts. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-15.) 
The State's argument is not supported by the law, or a plain reading of the 
criminal restitution statutes.2 Idaho Code § 19-5304 guides restitution that can be 
ordered in a criminal case. Under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a): 
2 The case law addressing the standards for statutory construction and interpretation 
are articulated in Ms. Schultz' Appellant's Brief, and thus, in the interest of brevity, are 
not rearticulated, but incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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"[e]conomic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-
of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from 
the criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as 
pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress. 
Id. (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(e) defines a victim to mean "The 
directly injured victim which means a person or entity who suffers economic loss or 
injury as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct .... " Id. (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) cautions that "a defendant shall not be required to make 
restitution in an amount beyond that authorized by this chapter." Id. Further, "[t]he 
court may, with the consent of the parties, order restitution to victims, and/or any other 
person or entity, for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not adjudicated or 
are not before the court." I.C. § 19-5304(9) (emphasis added). 
Admittedly, Ms. Schultz was convicted of grand theft by unauthorized control by 
"knowingly exercise[ing] unauthorized control and/or made unauthorized transfer of an 
interest over credit card accounts and/or bank accounts, the property of Audrey Shayne, 
with the intent to deprive the owner thereof and/or did the above taking in a value in 
excessive of One Thousand Dollars .... " (R., p.22.) Ms. Schultz is clearly responsible 
to pay restitution for amounts "resulting from [her] criminal conduct," but absent consent, 
the district court cannot order restitution for alleged "crimes which are not adjudicated." 
Logic dictates that if a jury is not offered evidence of alleged criminal conduct, then that 
conduct cannot be adjudicated, and is therefore prohibited by the statute. 
Ms. Schultz' "strained interpretation" of Idaho's restitution statutes is consistent 
with Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 
(Ct. App. 2007), which was not cited by the State in its briefing. (See Respondent's 
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Brief, p.9 (In referencing Ms. Schultz' position, the State argued, "Such strained 
interpretation of the restitution statutes is inconsistent with and undermines the statute's 
plain meaning and public policy.") In Shafer, the defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the 
scene of an injury accident and the district court ordered restitution in injuries derived 
from the accident itself. Id. 144 Idaho at 371-372, 161 P.3d 690-691. On appeal, 
Shafer argued that the district court erred in ordering restitution for injuries resulting 
from the accident, not from the criminal conduct to which Shafer pleaded guilty. Id. 
Interpreting I.C. § 19-5304, the Court of Appeals agreed with Shafer and concluded that 
the district court did not have statutory authority to order restitution because "the victim's 
losses did not result from the criminal act to which [Shafer] pleaded guilty." Id. 
Here, like Shafer, allegations that Ms. Schultz' improperly used the contested 
monies was not adjudicated because the jury was never offered evidence of any 
improper or illegal use with regard to those contested amounts. Because those 
restitution amounts were not adjudicated, absent consent, statutorily they cannot be 
ordered by the district court. Accordingly, the district court erred in ordering restitution 
in an amount exceeding $19,421. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
of restitution and enter an order of restitution in the amount of $19.421. 
DATED this 301h day of June, 2007. 
ER~SEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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